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The "Special 301" provisions of the 1988 Trade Act:
Intellectual property, unilateral retaliation
and lrido-US trade
JAY ERSTI1NG & JENN1FERmAMBA YAH

On August 23, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 19881 (1988 Trade Act). In enacting the legislation, Congress
vented its "festering frustration"2 with the direction and results of U.S. trade policy, and
sought more potent solutions to alleviate America's growing trade woes.3 Among the
most controversial and important changes brought about by the 1988 Trade Act are the
"Special 301" provisions,4 which attempt to open foreign markets to U.S. exports and
investment by threatening retaliation against inadequate and ineffective protection abroad
for intellectual property rights.
This paper first provides an overview of "Special 301", next looks at how the
provisions have been applied worldwide, and then focuses on the operation of "Special
301" in 'India, one of the countries singled out for alleged intellectual property abuses
under the new legislation.

Overview

or

"Special

301"

The "Special 301" provisions amend and expand section 301 of the Trade Act of
of an overall strategy to ensure
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights and fair and equitable
market access for United States persons that rely on protection of intellectual property
rights."6 To achieve that purpose, the provisions establish a special procedure requiting
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to identify each year those countries that
do not adequately and effectively protect intellectual property rights or that deny fair and
equitable market access to products protected by intellectual property rights.7 Countries
1974.s Their purpose is "to provide for the development

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, August 23, 1988 102 Stat.
1107.
Hearing on Title of S. 1860 and S. 1862. Before the Senate Cornm. on Finance, 99 the Cong., 2d
Sess (1986) (statement of Chairman Robert Packwood (R.Or.».
At the time the 1988 Trade Act was enacted, the arumal U.S. trade deficit was estimated to reach $ 137
billion. For the fIrst time since World War I, the United States became a net debtor at the end of 1985,
and has remained so ever since.
Pub.
No. 100-418, title I, section 1303, August 23, 1988. 102 State. 1179 (codilled in 19 U.S.C.
2242 and 2411 et seq). [hereinafter cited by reference to the United States Code].
Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, 88 State. 1978, 19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq
H.R. 3, l00th Congo 1st Sess., section 1303(a) (2), Congo REC. H. 1886 (Apr 20, 1988). The
purpose undencores the Congressional fInding that "international protection of intellectual property
rights is vital" to US competitiveness. Ibid., section 1303(a) (1).
19. U.S.c. 2242(aXl)(A) and (8):
"By no laler than the date that is 30 days after the date on which the annual report is submitted to
Congressional committees under section 2241(b), the United States Trade Representative ....
shall
identify-(l)
those foreign countries-(A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, or (8) deny fair and equitable market access to United States penons that rely upon
intellectual property protection ... ."
The procedure appears to be targeted primarily at rooting out purported piracy -. -.

II

L
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that have been identified are designated as "priority foreign countries"l and become subject
to the imposition of trade sanctions.2
The provisions mandate the method to be used by the USTR in identifying priority
foreign countries. The USTR must consult with appropriate Federal agencies, including
the Copyright and Patent Offices, consider information and petitions furnished by
interested persons, and take into account the conclusions reached in the annual National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barrier (NTE report).3 The purpose of the NTE
report, which is submitted to Congress by the USTR, is to identify and analyse foreign
acts, policies, or practices that constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of, trade.4
The provisions also make clear that the USTR's authority should be used sparingly
as only the countries with the "most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices"
may be identified. S Examples include countries whose practices have the greatest actual or
potential adverse impact on U.S. products, countries that have not entered into good faith
negotiations to eliminate intellectual property problems, or countries that are not making
significant progress in bilateral or multilateral intellectual property negotiations. Of
particular importance to Congress in designating the last criterion was whether foreign
countries were "participating constructively" in multilateral fora such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) "Uruguay Round" negotiations on trade related
aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS).6
The USTR has thirty days following his/her submission of the NTE report to
Congress to identify priority foreign countries. Once an identification has been made the
USTR is required, within an additional thirty days, to initiate a section 301 investigation
unless he/she determines that such an investigation would be detrimental to US
economic interests. In that case, however, the USTR must justify his/her decision in
writing to Congress and must specify the economic interests that would be adversely
affected by the investigation.?
The purpose of a section 301 investigation is two fold: to determine whether any of
the cited acts, policies or practices of the priority foreign country is "unreasonable or
discriminatory
and burdens or restricts United States commerce";8 and, if so, to

--+ --+ of US intellectual' property rights in the computer software, pharmaceutical, motion picture,

and publishing industries.

'

1.

19 U.S.c.

2.

19 U.S.C. 2411(c). The trade sanctions include suspending, withdrawing, or preventing the
application of concessions, or imposing duties or other import restrictions.
19 U.S.C. 2242(bX2). The procedure for establishing the NTE report is dermed in 19 U.S.C. 2241.
19 U.S.C. 2242 (B)(I)(A).
19 U.S.C. 2242(b)(I)(B) and (C). It may be assumed that Congress intended the terms "good faith
negotiations" and "significllllt progress' to mean accommodations and concessions by America's
trading partners.
See, for example, Main Pursuing U.S. Goals Bilaterally: Intellectual Property and "Special 301",
Business America, Septemhl:r 25, 1989, at 6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October, 30,
1947,61 State. (5) A3, T.l.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187. The TRIPS negotiations originated with
a proposal from the United States (see U.S. Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, 34 PaL Tradem:uk & Copyright J. (BNA) 667 (1987); if successful, they
will result in the conclusion of a comprehensive code of intellectual property protection that
strengthens the current standards of pfCllectionand establishes a unifonn enforcement mechanism.
19 U.S.C. 2412(b)(2). The USTR has the discretion not to institute an investigation if he/she
determines that trade sanctions would not be effective in eliminating the intellectual property abuse.
19 U.S.C. 2412(c).
19. V.S.C. 241l(b (1).

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

2242(a)(2).
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recommend appropriate trade sanctions to remedy the abuse.t In carrying out the
investigation, the USTR must request consultations with the priority foreign country as
well as seek the advice of appropriate Government agencies and interested persons.2
Although the time limit for all other section 301 investigations is at least 12 months
form the date of initiation, investigations brought under the "Special 301" provisions are
on the "fast track" and must, in most cases, be completed within six months.3
If the USTR determines that trade sanctions are necessary and appropriate, he/she has
a powerful array from which to choose. For example, the USTR may recommend
suspension of trade agreement concessions, the imposition of duties, and the withdrawal
of designation under the General System of Preferences.' Subject to specific directions
from the President, the USTR must implement his/her recommendations within the
following 30 days.s

Application

of the "Special

301" provisions

To satisfy the statutory deadlines, the USTR made her first determinations under the
uSpecial 301" provisions on May 25, 1989, "Because of significant progress made in
various negotiations,"6 particularly the conclusion of a "framework" agreement in the
GAIT TRIPS negotiations,7 the USTR decided not to identify priority foreign countries,
and initiate the section 301 investigation procedure. Instead, she singled out 25 countries,
whose practices, in her view, deserved "Special attention ...
because they maintain
intellectual property-related practices or barriers to market access that are of particular
concern."s She placed 17 of those countries on a "Watch List", and announced that the
United States would "step up its efforts to resolve problems" attributed to those
countries.9 The remaining eight countries, whose practices were considered to suffer from
the most serious problems, were named to a "Priority Watch List." The Priority Watch
List Countries were Brazil, India, Mexico, People's Republic of China, Republic of
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Thailand.tO
For each country included on the Priority Watch List, the USTR outlined and
1.
2.
3.

See supra note 2, pp 118.
19 U.S.c. 2413 and 2414 (b)
19 U.S.C. 2414(a)(3)(A). the USTR may grant a three-month extension "if 'complex or complicated
issues are involved" or if the priority foreign country is "making substantial progress" in providing
adequate intellectual property protection. 19 U.S.C. (a)(3)(B).
4.
See, supra, note 2, pp 118.
5.
19 U.S.C. 2415. The USTR may grant a delay of up to 180 days, however, if substantial progress is
being made by the priority foreign country toward reaching "a satisfactory solution with respect to
the acts, policies, or practices that are the subject of the action." Ibid.
6.
USTR Fact Sheet for "Special 301" on Intellectual Property, 38 PaL Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
131 (1989)
7.
In April 1989, the delegates to the TRIPS negotiations reached agreement on a frame work to serve as
a guide for the elaboration of a Uruguay Round intellectual property code. The framework text permits
the scope of the negotiations to include adequate substantive intellectual property standards,
enforcement mechanisms, and a disputes settlement procedure. Many countries, in particular
developing ones, opposed the TRIPS negotiations as constituting an unwarranted and illegitimate
expansion of GATT jurisdiction; the conclusion of the framework agreement was therefore viewed as
an important breakthrough by the USTR.
8.
See, supra, note 6.
9.
The Watch List countries are: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
According to the USTR, "1lJ foreign country currently meets every standard for adequate and effective
intellectual property protection ...•. Supra, note 6.
10. See, supra note, 6 at 132. Brazil and India, together with Japan, have also been singled out and
identified as priority foreign countries under the "Super 301" provisions of the 1988 Trade Act.
"Super 301" is broader than "Special 301" and is targeted at countries with a consistent, generalized
pattern of "major barrien and trade distorting practices." 19 U.S.C. 2420.
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accelerated action plan to resolve outstanding issues, and declared her intention to pursue
the plans during the following 150 days. She further stated that she would review the
status of the Priority Watch List countries no later than November 1, 1989, taking into
account the extent to which the objectives of the accelerated action plans [had] been
achieved."1 Although the plans differed in detail from country to country, in general they
called for the broadening of the scope of patentable subject matter, the introduction or
expansion of the grant of copyright protection, stepped up enforcement against
intellectual property piracy, and "constructive participation" in multilateral intellectual
property negotiations.2
On November 1, 1989, the USTR announced the results of her review: she
downgraded the status of the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan from the
Priority Watch List to the secondary Watch List; but left Brazil, India, Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, and Thailand on the Priority List for continued close
scrutiny. The rationale for the USTR's decision was that the three downgraded countries
had all displayed "significant commitments to changing their intellectual property
policies. "3 The USTR was impressed that Saudi Arabia had pledged to enact a copyright
law compatible with the obligations of the Berne Convention, an important copyright
treaty recently ratified by the United States,· that Taiwan was working to modify its
copyright laws and to resolve a dispute over alleged pirating of videotapes, and that the
Republic of Korea had created an intellectual property task force and increased the use of
police to deter intellectual property piracy.~
The USTR's decision to downgrade the three countries was met with only lukewarm
support by American industry. The greatest scepticism was voiced by the International
Intellectual Property Alliance (lIP A),' a prominent US trade association coalition that
represents more than 1,600 companies in the recording, publishing, computer software,
motion picture and music publishing industries. According to the lIP A, no country on the
Priority Watch List had made significant progress to warrant downgrading, and two
countries on the secondary Watch List-Malaysia and Turkey-deserved
to be added to the
Priority List for reluctance to correct alleged intellectual property wrongs.6
Despite the opinion of the IIPA, the USTR declared that she was "encouraged by the
genuine progress made in the protection of intellectual property by our trading partners. "7
She will soon have another opportunity for comment as the next deadline for
identifications under the "Special 301" provisions is April 30, 1990.
Based on the USTR's findings, it may be argued that the "Special 301" provisions are
succeeding in encouraging increased awareness and higher levels of intellectual property
protection. The provisions have not. however, been universally greeted with warmth and
1.
2.
3.
4.

S.
6.

7.

See, supra, note 6, pp 119, al 132.
Ibid, al 132-133. The acceleraled action plan for India is discussed in greater de1ail, infra.
USTR Removes Three. Nations from Intellectual Property List. 39, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 30 at 31 (1989).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Ironically, it may be argued that
US copyright law (17 U.S.C. 101-810) is not fully compatible with the Berne Convention because
the US law fails to provide sufficient protection for the "moral rights" of authors as required by the
conventions Article 6 bis.
See, supra, note 3.
Ibid. In the IIPA's opinion, Malaysia had been "dragging its heels" concerning the enactment of a
m:w copyright law, and Turkey had "not been forthcoming" in its copyright coverage of sound
recordings. While the USTR refused to upgrade the two countries to priority status, she stated that she
intended to "step up efforts to make progress with (theml" and called their recent attitude toward
intellectual property "disturbing."Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabia removed from USTR's "Priority Walch
List," 3 World Int. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 262 at 263 (1989).
3 World InL Prop. Rep (BNA) at 262 (1989).
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encountered resistance and criticism. Particularly disturbing to the provisions critics is
that the United States seems to have ignored prevailing standards of intemationallaw by
allowing for unilateral retaliation without regard to GAIT dispute resolution procedure,!
and by attempting to impose norms of intellectual propertY protection stricter than those
required by existing treaties.2 Among the voices of criticism, the strongest and most
compelling have come from India.

India and "Special 301"
The 1989 NTE report, which the USTR submitted to Congress in April 1989, found
that India did "not provide adequate and effective protection for US intellectual property
rights" and that "Indian Government officials [had] not responded positively to repeated
U.S. proposals for changes in India's patent, trademark and copyright laws."3 Specific
complaints in the report concerned India's prohibition against the grant of product patents
for foods, pharmaceuticals and chemical substances; the relatively short duration for all
other patents; stringent compulsory licensing provisions, lack of aggressive copyright
enforcement; lack of protection for service marks (i.e., trademarks for services); and the
difficulty of using foreign trademarks in the domestic market 4 Consequently, in placing
India on the Priority Watch List, the USTR included the following in India's accelerated
action plan:
Improved and adequate patent protection for all classes of inventions
Elimination of discrimination against use of foreign trademarks
Registration of service marks
Improved enforcement against piracy.5
In addition, perhaps because India had forthrightly opposed US positions in the GAIT
Uruguay Round TRIPS negotiations as well as in inter governmental meetings of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WlPO),6 the USTR demanded "constructive
participation in multilateral intellectual property negotiations".7

I.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

As intellectual property protection is currently outside the scope of GATI Rules, it may be argued
that alleged abuses of intellectual property rights may not give rise to actionable trade barriers in
conformity with Article III of GATI. In this regard see GAIT COlUlCilFinds that section 337
DiscrimifUltes against Foreign Companus, 39 Pat.. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 29 (1989).
The principal treaties are the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The problem is that "the United States
Government has taken the position that the present intellectual property treaties ... can no longer be
regarded as instruments sufficiently responsive to modem protective needs of intellectual property
owners and. consequently, the interests of the national economies of the states party to these
treaties." Kunz-Hallstein. The United States Proposal for a GAIT Agreement on Intellectual Property
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 22 Vand. J. Transnat. L 265 at
267 (1989). See also U.S. Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. 34, Pat., Trademark & Copyright J (BNA) 667 (1987).
1989 NatiofUll Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. India Section, reproduced in
Economic News from the United States. May 1989. at 9.
Ibid at 9-10.
See, supra. note 6, pp 119, at 132-133.
India is often chosen to speak on behalf of all developing countries in inter governmental intellectual
property meetings. A recent example of India's successful opposition to US policy within WlPO was
the negotiation of a treaty on intellectual property protection for the layout-designs of semi
conductor chips.
The accelerated action plan for India also mentioned the following: "Effective protection of wellknown marks: improved access and distribution for U.S. motion pictures; and conclusion of an
intellectual property annex to the bilateral science and technology agreement" Supra. note 5.
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The USTR's announce~ent met with strong condemnation in India. Many lawyers,
industrialists, journalists and academics attacked India's inclusion on the Priority Watch
List as unjustified, unnecessary, and a distortion of long standing precepts of international
law and nations sovereignty.! A closer look at 'some of the USTR's allegations indicate
that the Indian criticism is not without merit.
The USTR's primary complaint concerns provisions in the Indian Patents Act that
exclude from the scope of patent protection products "(a)-intended for the use, or capable
of being used as food or as medicine or drug, or (b) relating to substances prepared or
produced by chemical processes. "2 Patents for processes of manufacture are permitted,
however.3 The problem, according to the USTR, is that since usually more than one
process can be used to make most pharmaceutical or chemical products, process patents
alone do not adequately protect U.S. companies that have invented the product under the
original process. Therefore, Indian pharmaceutical and chemical companies may locally
manufacture and sell identical products without violating the Indian patent law, which,
according to USTR, constitutes an unfair barrier to US trade.4 To remedy that barrier, the
USTR has called upon India to amend its Patents Act in order to allow product patents for
pharmaceuticals, chemicals and foods.
As cogent as the USTR's demand for product patenting may seem from the point of
view of U.S. competitiveness in world markets, it lacks legitimacy from the point of
view of prevailing international legal standards-an
argument frequently raised by the
Indian critics. Patent law is primarily regulated on an international basis by the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the standardsset by the treaty
are generally recognized as the minimum requirements for all national industrial property
legislation.s Although India is not a member of the Paris Convention, the proviSIons of
the Indian Patents Act on pharmaceutical and chemical product patenting do not violate
the treaty, which permits each country to determine the scope of its patentable subject
matter. According to the Indian critics, India needs to adopt a restricted scope of
patentability in order to develop indigenous pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Thus,
while the USTR may have the best interests of US commerce at heart, she is incorrectly
attempting to hold India to norms higher than those currently acceptable under
international law .
The same holds true for the USTR's complaints with respect to the duration of patent
protection and the registration for service marks. The India Patents Act provides for a
duration of five years from the date of grant (or seven from the date of filing) for process
patents for foods or medicines, and fourteen years from the date of filing for all other
patents.6 In contrast, patent duration in the U.S. is at least 17 years from the date of
grant.7 From a US point of view, the Indian Act clearly establishes an inadequate
duration; nevertheless, the Indian Act does not violate international standards since the
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Probably because of the then impending national elections in India. there was little official
Government reaction. Although those elections resulted in the formation of a new Government. a
significant change in Indian intellectual property policy is unlikely.
The Patents Act, 1970 (Act 39 of 1970), section 5.
Ibid.
See U.S. Seeks Improved Intellectual Property Protection in India, Economic News from the United
States, July 1989, p, 2 (eXplanation of USTR official). As a result of India's patent policy, however,
it is frequently asserted that the price of Indian pharmaceuticals is among the lowest in the world,
which is in the best interest of India and all developing countries. See for example, Subramaniam,
U.S. Tltrtat and /ndia's Optums. The Hindu, June, 14 1989; and Sharma, Property ties, thorn in/1II10US Ties, Times of India, April, IS, 1989.
With respect to the US attitude, however, see supra, note 2, pp 121.
The Plltents Act, 1970, sections 53 and 45.
35 U.S.C. 154.

The "SpeciaI30!"

provisions of the 1988 Trade Act

123

Paris Convention sets no patent duration requirements. Instead, the Convention allows
each counlry to make its own determination in accordance with its national needs, and the
majority view in India, as flawed as that view might arguably be, is that a short patent
duration is best suited to the country's level of economic and industrial development
Similarly, the Paris Convention does not require service mark registration, but
merely service mark protection.! As with all common law countries, India permits actions
to be brought for the tort of passing off, which has traditionally been deemed sufficient to
meet the Paris Convention's protection standard.
In singling out India for its compulsory licensing provisions,
its copyright
enforcement practices, and its restrictions on the use of foreign trademarks in the local
market, Indian critics maintain that the USTR has over-reacted and ignored recent national
developments.2 For example, although the Patents Act permits the grant of compulsory
licences that breach the limitations set by the Paris Convention, such licences have rarely
been issued in past years.J According to the critics, the USTR has also failed to accord
sufficient credence to the recent amendments to the Indian Copyright Act, which provide
stronger remedies against copyright piracy and expressly protect computer software,4 and
has overlooked the growing trend toward trade liberalization, which has already resulted in
permission for more extensive use of foreign trademarks.s In view of these developments,
and as the USTR may only single out countries with the "most onerous or egregious ..
practices,"6
the USTR's decision to place India on the Priority Watch List seems
nearsighted and insular.
Perhaps most irksome to the Indian critics is the accusation levelled by the USTR of
India's failure to participate "constructively" in the GAIT Uruguay Round TRIPS
negotiations. Indian nationals are generally proud (with justification) of their country's
position as the voice of the developing world in multilateral fora; therefore, any veiled
threat or attempt to interfere with or influence that role is not taken lightly. To make
mallers worse, the USTR's criticism of India came only one month after the Indian
delegation to the TRIJ>S negotiations had made an important concession to the United
States by consenting to the TRIPS framework agreement. The Indian press deemed the
concession a "surrender", and severely castigated the delegation for getting "caught in the
TRIPS trap."?
In naming India to the Primary Watch List, the USTR failed to recognise the
significance of the Indian concession and proved insensitive to the tension that the TRIPS
negotiations were generating in India. At least partly in response to the USTR's action,
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Paris convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Article 6 sexies. Although the Indian Trade
and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, as amended, provides exclusively for the registration of marks for
goods, some service marks that are used also as trademarks have apparently been registered. It should
also be noted that the grant of service mark registration is a relatively new trend, embraced only
recently, for example, by the United Kingdom.
See, for example, Panagariya , India as Scapegoat, Times of India (Bombay), June, 23, 1989; and
Mohan, TM U.S. Threat of a Trade Hegemony. The Hindu, June 7 1989.
Compare the Patents Act, section 97, and the' Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Article, 5A. Only two licences were granted from 1970-1985, for example. See Bhatnagar,
TM role of Patems in Research and Developf1ll!ntin India, 1985 Industrial Property at 171 (May
1985).
See the Copyright Act, as amended to 1984, section 2(0) and Ch. Xli.
An example is the recent effort to relax restrictions on the use of the COCA-COLA and PEPSI-COLA
trademark s.
19 U.S.c. 2242 (b) (1) (A).
See Malhotra, Political Commentary Caught in 1M Trips Trap, Times of India, April, 20, 1989; and
Intelleclual Property Rights: TM Geneva Surrender Economic and Political weeldy, June 3, 1989, at
1201.
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the Indian delegation toughened its stand in the TRIPS negotiations and issued a forcefui
position paper denouncing the need for increased standards of intellectual property
protection.l Thus, although the USTR evidently placed India on the Priority Watch List
to pressure and encourage it to fall into line with US intellectual property rights policy,
the tactic has failed to achieve immediate results and may even backfire.

Conclusion
On the face of it, the "Special 301" provisions seem to have a legitimate purpose.
Inadequate and ineffective protection of intellectual property rights contribute to America's
burgeoning trade deficit For example, the U.S. International Trade Commission recently
estimated that U.S. business loses more than $ 40 billion a year as a result of piracy of
American intellectual property.2 Viewed superficially, therefore, unilateral retaliation
appears to be a natural solution.
However reasonable that position may seem, it cannot be justified from an
international standpoint. As their operation in India makes clear, the "Special 301"
provisions are grounded on the presumption that "what is good for the U.S. is good for
India and the developing countries and, by the same token, for the entire world. "3 They
further presume that the USTR may dictate to foreign nations what the content of their
intellectual property laws should be, without regard to long standing notions of national
autonomy and sovereignty. Both presumptions are wrong. The United States must
recognize that what [it] might consider as a desirable norm may not be a right norm for
another country placed in a different position, economically, socially or culturally."4 The
sooner it does so, the sooner the U.S. can get down to the business of finding a lasting
solution to its trade crisis.

1.

2.
3.
4.

Standards and Principles Concerning tM Availability scope and Use of Trade Related intellectual
property Rights, paper presenled by A.V. Ganesan, Special Secretary to the Uruguay Round
negotiatiOns (copy on me with author). See also Prabhu, /PR: /ndi4 Toughens Stand, Economic
Times of India, July 28, 1989.
See 36 Pat. TrademaIk Copyright 1. at 401 (1988).
Crowbar Still TMre. The Times of India (Bombay), June 21, 1989.
Economic and Political Weekly, supra, note 7, pp 123 at 1202.

